Personal Torts by Branson, Frank L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 50




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I. NEGLIGENCE ........................................... 1410
A. DUTY AND BREACH ................................... 1410
B. CAUSATION ........................................... 1413
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ............................. 1414
D. VICARIOUS LIABILITY ................................. 1416
E. NEGLIGENT HIRING ................................... 1416
F. CRIMINAL AcTs OF THIRD PARTIES ................... 1416
G. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE .......................... 1417
1. M edical M alpractice ............................... 1417
2. Legal M alpractice ................................. 1418
II. PERSONAL TORTS ..................................... 1418
A. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF
PRIVACY .............................................. 1418
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ... 1419
C. WRONGFUL DEATH ................................... 1419
D. PREMISES LIAB LITY ................................... 1420
E. PRODUCT LIABILITY ................................... 1420
F. GOVERNMENTAL/OFFICIAL IMMUNITY ................. 1422
G. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT ............................ 1424
1. Premise or Special Defect .......................... 1424
2. Condition or Use of Property ...................... 1424
H . D AMAGES ............................................. 1425
1. M ental Anguish ................................... 1425
2. Exemplary Damages ............................... 1426
I. INSURANCE ............................................ 1427
J. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ............................ 1427
K. FEDERAL REGULATION PREEMPTION OF TORT
C LA IM S ............................................... 1428
L . O THER ................................................ 1429
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., L.L.M., Southern Methodist University;
Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas. The writer wishes to acknowledge





A. DUTY AND BREACH
URING this Survey period, Texas courts have addressed the
concept of duty, reiterating the well-established elements. In
Doe v. Franklin,' the El Paso Court of Appeals discussed duty in
the context of preventing another party's criminal conduct. The court
recognized that a person does not have a duty to prevent another's crimi-
nal acts unless "a special relationship [exists] between the tortfeasor and
the criminal actor," such as the parent-child relationship or the employer-
employee relationship.2 In discussing the duty owed, the court reasoned
that "a person has a duty to not place another in harm's way of foresee-
able criminal activity."'3 The court considered the traditional factors in
determining whether a duty existed: "risk, foreseeability, likelihood of
injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, magnitude
of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of
placing the burden on the defendant."'4
In Doe, the defendant was providing child care for the plaintiffs. Un-
fortunately, the care giver was married to a pedophile, and the court held
that "[i]t is foreseeable that a child will be victimized if left alone or
brought into close proximity with a pedophile. '' 5 The court points out
that where the defendant "knew or should have known of her husband's
proclivities" to molest their grandchild, the defendant's duty was to "have
taken steps to ensure that her granddaughter would not be placed in
harm's way or to otherwise ensure that her husband would not be in a
position to act on his temptations."'6 Noting that "care giving is more a
social necessity than a social utility," the court relied upon Cain v. Cain7
in holding that "a duty exists to not place a child in a situation in which
the risk of sexual abuse is heightened and in which the risk is
foreseeable." 8
A police officer claimed a protestor owed him a duty in Juhl v. Air-
ington.9 A group of demonstrators attempted to block access to an abor-
tion clinic. Police officers at the scene ordered the demonstrators to leave
the premises; those who did not leave were forcibly removed by the po-
lice. In attempting to remove one demonstrator, an officer injured his
back. The officer filed suit against the protester he forcibly removed, the
protest organizer, and other protesters who were present when he injured
1. 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
2. Id. at 927.
3. Id.
4. Id. (quoting Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.
1990)).
5. Id. at 928.
6. Id.
7. 870 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
8. Doe, 930 S.W.2d at 928-29.
9. 936 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996).
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his back. The allegations of negligence included a foreseeable confronta-
tion with the police, creating a situation that they knew or should have
known would risk injury to others, and failing to obey the lawful orders of
the police.
The trial court granted the demonstrators summary judgment on the
ground that they owed no duty to prevent a fellow protester from injuring
the officer. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed, holding that if the
protest group was an unincorporated association, the individual members
could be liable for the actions of the others acting in concert.10 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment against the plaintiff.
The court noted that each demonstrator was left to his own discretion
regarding whether to obey an officer's order." Also, basing an individ-
ual's liability on one group association member's tortious act "would pose
serious threats to the right of free association.' 2 The court further ar-
ticulated that "liability of members of a group should be analyzed in
terms of the specific actions undertaken, authorized or ratified by those
members," regardless of incorporation status.13 Moreover, the court
noted that the question remains open whether "concert of action" liabil-
ity as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876 is recog-
nized in Texas. 14
The duty owed by a boy scout troop was analyzed in Golden Spread
Council, Inc. v. Akins.' 5 In the summer of 1987, C.C. was molested four
times by Melvin Estes. A year later, a friend invited C.C. to join Boy
Scout Troop 22. Unbeknownst to C.C., Estes was the assistant scoutmas-
ter for the troop. Despite Estes's involvement with the troop, C.C. joined
the unit. Estes did not molest C.C. while the two were associated with
Troop 22. During a camping trip with the unit, C.C. confided in several of
the members that Estes had molested him previously. Other scouts said
that Estes had tried similar acts with them. One of the scouts who over-
heard this discussion was the son of the head scoutmaster. The son noti-
fied his father, and the father reported the matter to a Golden Spread
Council employee, Herbert. The scoutmaster did not specify that the
matter concerned sexual molestation.
Herbert made a report to the scout executive for Golden Spread. Af-
ter being instructed to investigate the matter further, Herbert reported to
the executive that the son would not disclose the names of the boys, the
son was a known liar, and that Estes and the head scoutmaster were in-
volved in a family feud. Golden Spread did not relay this information to
the local police or Boy Scouts of America, and it did not undertake fur-
ther investigation. A short time later, a church group decided to start its
own troop. Herbert and the district scout committee had the responsibil-
10. Id. at 642.
11. Id. at 645.
12. Id. at 642.
13. Id. at 643.
14. Id.
15. 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1996).
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ity of putting the church in touch with potential scoutmasters. Herbert
and the committee introduced Estes to the church, which chose him as
the scoutmaster.
Upon assignment to the new troop, Estes persuaded C.C. to leave
Troop 22 and to join his troop. Estes resumed his advances toward C.C.
and attempted to molest him on at least two occasions. In January of
1989, Estes was arrested for child molestation, and was subsequently con-
victed and imprisoned. Akins, C.C.'s mother, sued Boy Scouts of
America and Golden Spread for negligent failure to properly screen and
supervise Estes and for failure to remove Estes from his position as scout-
master. The trial judge granted summary judgment for both the Boy
Scouts and Golden Spread, which the appellate court reversed. The
Texas Supreme Court concluded that the Boy Scouts did not owe a duty
to C.C., yet Golden Spread did. 16 The court balanced the traditional fac-
tors listed above to determine that the imposition of a duty on Golden
Spread was warranted. 17 The court held that a fact finder could deter-
mine that Herbert and Golden Spread should have foreseen that the rec-
ommendation of Estes would endanger scouts. 18 The court also weighed
the social value of scouting and concluded that Golden Spread still owed
a duty to report its knowledge regarding Estes.19
In Sipes v. City of Longview,20 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held
that "the City of Longview owed no duty to [the motoring public] to elim-
inate or warn of tall median grass at the location of the [automobile] acci-
dent" without a showing of ownership, dominion, or control over the
median. 21 The court of appeals recognized that the Texas Department of
Transportation chooses to retain control by contracting with a mowing
company; thus, the City of Longview had no control of the median and no
duty to warn or eliminate the danger.22
In Graham v. Freese & Nichols, Inc.,23 the Eastland Court of Appeals
held that an engineering firm did not owe a duty to a general contractor's
employee who was injured at a dam construction site because it had no
control over the premises or the safety precautions.24 The engineer's du-
ties did not include control over the premises based on the provisions in
his contract.25 The court reasoned that, absent control, there can be no
duty.26
According to Old v. Lefmark Management Co.,27 a property owner has
16. Id. at 289.
17. Id. at 290.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 925 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 927 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, writ requested).
24. Id. at 295.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. 908 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
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a duty to convey knowledge of prior criminal conduct to a subsequent
purchaser. Phillip Old went to purchase donuts at Shipley's Donuts, lo-
cated in the Fairbanks Shopping Center. During an armed robbery which
was in progress, Mr. Old was shot and killed. Mr. Old's widow sued
Lefmark, the former manager of the shopping center, alleging that it cre-
ated dangerous conditions on the premises by allowing foreseeable crimi-
nal conduct and that it owed a duty to notify the new manager of the
history of the criminal activity in the area. The trial court granted
Lefmark's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that Lefmark owed "a duty to disclose to its successors any
knowledge of dangerous conditions affecting the shopping center. '28
B. CAUSATION
In Gillespie v. Century Products Co.,29 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals rejected the usual presumption that an adequate warning label on
an infant car seat would have been followed by the user of the product.30
The court found, under the circumstances of this case, that the adequacy
of the warning was irrelevant because nothing the manufacturer did or
failed to do could have prevented the death of the five-month-old child in
the automobile accident.31 Discussing the two elements of causation
(cause-in-fact and foreseeability), the court found that the lack of an ade-
quate warning was not the cause-in-fact of the child's death and, thus, the
first crucial element of causation was lacking.32
The proper use of a sole proximate cause instruction was defined in
Bel-Ton Electric Service, Inc. v. Pickle.33 Bel-Ton was .hired by LTV
Aerospace to renovate one of its hanger buildings. The renovation re-
quired Bel-Ton to move at least one of two sets of switches which con-
trolled the hanger doors. Bel-Ton moved only one set of switches. Some
time later, an employee deliberately jammed one set of switches, which
resulted in the doors closing automatically unless a switch was manually
held open. An LTV employee was found crushed to death by the hangar
doors. His widow sued for wrongful death, alleging that Bel-Ton's failure
to remove the set of switches was negligent. Bel-Ton requested a sole
proximate cause instruction based on the evidence that an LTV employee
jammed the switches after Bel-Ton had completed its work. The trial
court refused the instruction, and the jury found Bel-Ton liable. The
court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. It
held that Bel-Ton had presented evidence which, if believed by the jury,
would support the conclusion that the LTV employee was the sole proxi-
28. Id. at 20-21.
29. 936 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id. at 52-53.
32. Id. at 53.
33. 915 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1996).
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mate cause of the other employee's death.34 Based on that evidence, Bel-
Ton was entitled to the sole proximate cause instruction (i.e., that the
only cause of the employee's death was the act of jamming the switch,
and, therefore, Bel-Ton's actions were not the proximate cause of the
death). 35
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Texas Supreme Court first visited the issue of repressed memories
in the context of the statute of limitations in S.V. v. R.V.36 R.V., age 20,
sued her father for allegedly sexually abusing her over a 15-year period.
She filed suit more than two years after the date of the last alleged occur-
rence, claiming that she had repressed the memories of the abuse and did
not recover the memories until undergoing counseling. Experts at trial
testified that R.V.'s symptoms were consistent with childhood sexual
abuse syndrome. The trial court granted a directed verdict for her father.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the discovery
rule should apply and that R.V. should have two years from the date she
remembered the events to file suit.37
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. It restated the general principle:
"accrual of a cause of action is deferred in cases of fraud or in which the
wrongdoing is fraudulently concealed. '38 The remaining way to toll limi-
tations (in the absence of some disability) is the discovery rule which re-
quires two elements for repressed memories: (1) the wrongful act and
injury must be inherently undiscoverable at the time they occurred, and
(2) the wrongful act and injury must now be objectively verifiable. 39 The
court assumed, without deciding, that the act and injury were inherently
undiscoverable in this case. 40 However, the court held that recovered
memories do not satisfy the objectively verifiable element. 41 Accord-
ingly, the statute of limitations was not tolled and had expired before suit
was filed.
The statute of limitations was satisfied where a related entity defendant
was given notice within the proper time period in Thompson v. Commu-
nity Health Investment Corp.42 Youlanda Thompson died on September
21, 1990, at Colonial Hospital in Terrell, Texas. Prior to the filing of a
lawsuit, the owner of Colonial Hospital transferred it to a subsidiary cor-
poration, which sold the hospital to an unrelated corporation. Colonial
Hospital received notice under the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, article
4590i, section 4.01 within two years of Thompson's death and forwarded
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1995).
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4, 6.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 15, 20.
42. 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996).
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it to the subsidiary; the subsidiary did not receive the notice until more
than two years after the death of Thompson. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the subsidiary based on the statute of limitations,
which the appellate court affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed,
holding that pre-suit notice to a related hospital entity tolls the statute of
limitations with respect to a subsequent owner of the hospital under sec-
tion 4.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.43
In Brown v. Shwarts,44 the Waco Court of Appeals strictly applied
Texas Revised Civil Statute, article 4590i, section 10.01 "notwithstanding
any other law" to calculate the limitation period for wrongful death ac-
tions based on medical malpractice, despite realizing possible inequity.45
Section 10.01 dictates that an action for medical malpractice must be
brought within two years of first of three possible accrual dates: "(1) the
date the breach or tort occurred; (2) the date the [health care] treatment
that is the subject of the claim is completed; or (3) the date the hospitali-
zation for which the claim is made is completed." 46 A plaintiff cannot
choose the date to start the running of the limitation period on his action,
but must bring the suit within two years of the first of these three occur-
rences.47 Improper treatment prior to a child's birth starts the limitation
clock, not the actual birth or later death of the child.48
A mother's statute of limitations accrued at the birth of her child in
Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Arredondo.49 A mother brought a
wrongful death action against a hospital and physician for causing injury
to her son during delivery. The doctor delivered her son on July 17, the
newborn died on July 19, 1991, and she commenced suit on July 19, 1993.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the mother's statute of limitations
ran from the date of delivery under the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act.50 The court further held that the child's tolling provi-
sion of section 10.01 did not apply because the "provision tolls a claim's
accrual only when it is filed by a minor or on a minor's behalf." 51
The court in Jennings v. Burgess52 started the statute of limitations on
the date of a negligent medical referral, not the date the second doctor
actually saw the patient.53 On March 3, 1989, Jennings diagnosed Burgess
as having cancer on her nose. Although Burgess requested a referral to a
specialist, Jennings referred Burgess for treatment to Manning, a general
practice physician. Later, Manning referred Burgess to a specialist, who
43. Id. at 572.
44. 929 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.- Waco 1996, writ granted).
45. Id. at 612-13.
46. Id. (quoting Chambers v. Conaway, 883 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. 1993)).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 613. This holding is contrary to the legislative history of the Act and the
intent of the legislature.
49. 922 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. 1996).
50. Id. at 121.
51. Id. This is another restructure interpretation of article 4590i by the current court.
52. 917 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1996).
53. Id at 794.
1997] 1415
SMU LAW REVIEW
discovered the cancer had invaded her nose. Burgess sued Jennings for
the initial negligent referral to a general practitioner. The Texas Supreme
Court held that the claim was barred because the two year statute of limi-
tations, as governed by article 4590i, section 10.01 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes, ran from the date of the referral when Burgess was re-
ferred to a general practitioner instead of a specialist as she requested,
rather than when Burgess discovered the cancer had invaded her nose.54
D. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In NationsBank, N.A. v. Dilling,55 the Texas Supreme Court held that
vicarious liability is inapplicable to an employer in the absence of an em-
ployee's actual or apparent authority.5 6 A bank teller was involved in an
investment scheme that was used to defraud Dilling. Because that in-
volvement was not within the course and scope of her employment as a
teller, NationsBank could not be held vicariously liable to Dilling.57
E. NEGLIGENT HIRING
In Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins,58 the parents of a molested
boy accused the Boy Scouts of America and the local council of negli-
gently hiring an abusive scoutmaster. Under the facts of the case,59 such
an action must fail since neither entity hired the scoutmaster; instead,
they simply recommended him for hire.60
In NationsBank, N.A. v. Dilling,61 the defrauded investor also claimed
NationsBank negligently hired the teller. The Texas Supreme Court de-
fined the foreseeable injury of that alleged negligence as improper work
as a teller, not involvement in the investment scheme.62 Since the fraudu-
lent scheme against Dilling was not foreseeable to NationsBank, a negli-
gent hire cause of action failed.63
F. CRIMINAL Acrs OF THIRD PARTIES
Walker v. Harris64 turned on the issue of foreseeability of criminal con-
duct. Harris was stabbed to death at a four-plex in Brookshire. His sur-
vivors sued Walker, the owner of the four-plex, for negligent failure to
warn the public of criminal activity in the area and for negligent failure to
provide adequate security. The Texas Supreme Court, in affirming the
trial court's granting of summary judgment for Walker, held that, as a
54. Id.
55. 922 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1996).
56. Id. at 952.
57. See id. at 953.
58. 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1996).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
60. Akins, 926 S.W.2d at 290.
61. 922 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1996).
62. Id. at 953-54.
63. Id.
64. 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996).
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matter of law, the stabbing was not foreseeable where: (1) the city Police
Chief testified that the apartment is located in an area of low to moderate
crime, (2) the record indicated that the police had never been called to
the property to investigate a violent crime, and (3) the property had ever
been burglarized. 65
In Doe v. Franklin,66 a grandmother owed a duty not to leave her
grandchild alone with her grandfather because he had a known proclivity
to molest children. 67 Because of the known danger of criminal conduct,
the risk was foreseeable and the danger preventable. 68
According to Old v. Lefmark Management Co.,69 a property owner has
a duty to convey knowledge of prior criminal conduct to a subsequent
purchaser.70 Under the facts of the case,71 the court held that Lefmark
owed "a duty to disclose to its successors any [knowledge] of dangerous
conditions affecting the shopping center. '72
G. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
1. Medical Malpractice
In three related cases, the Texas Supreme Court recently prevented dis-
covery of a hospital's records relating to its initial granting of staff privi-
leges to a doctor in a medical malpractice suit against the doctor and the
hospital.73 Plaintiffs in Brownwood brought a wrongful death and sur-
vival action alleging that the doctor was negligent in his diagnosis and
treatment of the decedent and that the hospital was negligent in ex-
tending staff privileges to the doctor. Plaintiffs requested copies of the
following documents: (1) the doctor's application for staff privileges, (2)
the hospital's bylaws, and (3) the minutes of the board of trustees and/or
of the credentialing committee approving the doctor's application for
hospital privileges. Defendants objected to the production of these docu-
ments as privileged from discovery under section 5.06 of the Medical
Practice Act and section 161.032 of the Health & Safety Code. After an
in camera inspection, the trial court held that the documents were privi-
leged and denied discovery, making the proof for a negligent credential-
ing case inaccessible.74 The Texas Supreme Court held that the doctor's
application for staff privileges and the minutes of the trustees or creden-
tialing committee's meetings were privileged, but the hospital's by-laws,
65. Id. at 377-78.
66. 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
67. Id. at 928-29.
68. Id. See supra section I(A).
69. 908 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 1995, writ granted).
70. Id. at 20-21.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
72. Old, 908 S.W.2d at 20-21.
73. Brownwood Regional Hosp. v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 927 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.
1996); Memorial Hosp.-The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996); Irving
Healthcare Sys. v. Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996).
74. Brownwood, 927 S.W.2d at 26.
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rules, and regulations concerning medical staff were not privileged. 75
The extent of a hospital's obligations to warn third parties was dis-
cussed in Garcia v. Santa Rosa Health Care Corp.76 The court of appeals
held that health care professionals who discovered AIDS in a hemophil-
iac patient, which they believed was likely caused by services adminis-
tered by the health care workers themselves, were under a duty to warn
readily identifiable third parties who were potentially endangered so long
as the warning does not violate the hospital-patient relationship. 77 The
court reasoned that this case fell in line with two other cases finding a
duty in similar situations.78
2. Legal Malpractice
The scope of an attorney's duties was defined in Barcelo v. Elliott.7 9
Elliott drafted a will with a specific trust provision that distributed in-
come to Barcelo during her life. On Barcello's death, the trust would
terminate and the trustee would distribute a specific amount to her chil-
dren and siblings, with the remainder distributed to her grandchildren.
After Barcelo's death, two of her children contested the validity of the
trust and the probate court declared the trust invalid and unenforceable.
The intended remainder beneficiaries settled with the decedent's children
and sued Elliot and his firm for malpractice. In upholding summary judg-
ment for the attorneys, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that privity
is necessary to assert a legal malpractice claim: "an attorney retained by a
testator or settlor to draft a will or trust owes no professional duty of care
to persons named as beneficiaries under the will or trust." 80 The court
also rejected plaintiffs' contention that recovery was permissible under a
third party beneficiary contract theory.81
II. PERSONAL TORTS
A. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY
In Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc.,82 the El Paso Court of Appeals
held that a security guard who threatened to arrest a woman may have
defamed her because the threats may have falsely imputed criminal con-
duct to the woman.83 In reversing a summary judgment, the court of ap-
75. Id. at 27.
76. 925 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ requested).
77. Id. at 377.
78. Id. (citing Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ)(recognizing physician's duty to the motoring public to warn his patient of the side effects
of a drug prescribed for her); and Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340
(Cal. 1976) (holding that when a therapist reasonably believes that his patient poses a
serious danger of violence to a specific, readily indentifiable person, the therapist bears the
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect that person)).
79. 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
80. Id. at 578-79.
81. Id.
82. 921 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ denied).
83. Id. at 793.
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peals described the question as "whether [the guard's] statements falsely
imputed criminal conduct to her." 4 According to Duran, a security
guard verbally abused her when the guard requested that she move her
car. When asked for his name, the security guard threatened to arrest
her. That threat of an arrest formed the basis of Duran's suit for defama-
tion because the statements implied the commission of a crime and sub-
jected her to public ridicule.8 5
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In a decision that focused on the freedom of religion, the Texas
Supreme Court evaluated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Tilton v. Marshall.86 The court rejected plaintiffs' efforts to sue
Robert Tilton for intentional infliction of emotional distress for making
insincere religious representations and for breaching promises to read,
touch, and pray over tithes and prayer requests. The court concluded
that a determination of intentional infliction of emotional distress would
necessarily infringe on Tilton's constitutional rights because no conscien-
tious fact finder could determine whether Tilton's conduct was outra-
geous without first evaluating the truth or veracity of the religious beliefs
espoused by Tilton.87
C. WRONGFUL DEATH
The court in Zezulka v. Thapar88 dealt with a physician's duty to warn.
A psychiatrist began treating a Vietnam veteran after the veteran slapped
his stepfather at a family gathering. The psychiatrist determined that the
veteran suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and that he was
paranoid and delusional, specifically concerning his step-father and cer-
tain racial groups. The veteran later killed his step-father, and the vet-
eran's mother filed a wrongful death suit against the psychiatrist. She
contended that the psychiatrist was negligent in not warning her family
that her son contemplated killing his step-father. The trial court granted
the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
psychiatrist did not have a doctor-patient relationship with the plaintiff or
the step-father and therefore did not have a duty to warn them. 89 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that "[t]he existence
of a doctor-patient relationship is not presently a prerequisite for a
wrongful death action" and that a psychiatrist has a duty to warn a known
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).
87. Id. at 681.
88. No. 01-94-01195-CV, 1996 WL 37994 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.], Jan. 29,
1996, no writ) (not released for publication).
89. Id. at *5.
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person of specific threats made by the psychiatrist's patient.90
D. PREMISES LIABILITY
The absence of knowledge of a premises defect supported a summary
judgment in Motel 6 v. Lopez.9 1 Lopez alleged that she suffered injuries
when she fell in the shower in her room at a Motel 6 in El Paso. Lopez
sued Motel 6 and two manufacturers of the shower for negligence. Motel
6 moved for summary judgment on the premises liability claim, alleging
no actual or constructive knowledge of any defect with the shower. At-
tached to the motion was an affidavit from the motel manager who stated
that she was unaware of prior similar occurrences, that she had not re-
ceived any complaints concerning the safety of a shower stall, and that
the stall had been cleaned before Lopez entered it. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Motel 6 without stating the grounds for its
ruling. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, not-
ing that the premises liability claim failed because Motel 6 did not have
either constructive or actual knowledge that an unreasonably dangerous
condition existed. 92
The court in Johnson County Sheriffs Posse, Inc. v. Endsley93 rejected
a premises liability claim against a rodeo arena. A spectator at a barrel
race suffered a serious eye injury when he was struck by an unknown
object, apparently thrown by a horse in the barrel race. Endsley sued the
facility lessor for negligence under premises liability. Based on the facts
of the case, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that dirt containing small
rocks is not an unreasonably dangerous condition for which a landlord
may be held liable.94
E. PRODUCT LIABILITY
In Firestone Steel Products Co. v. Barajas,95 Firestone designed and
patented a wheel rim that enabled installation of a tubeless tire on the
wheel rim for trucks. The wheel rim was only designed for dual wheels.
Firestone permitted use of the design by its competitors without charging
a patent license fee. Subsequently, another company modified the design
for use with single wheels. Firestone neither participated in the modifica-
tion nor collected a royalty from the single wheel design. While attempt-
ing to fix a flat tire, Barajas tried to place a 16 inch tire on a 16 1/2 inch
wheel rim made by the modifier company. The tire exploded and fatally
injured Barajas.
90. Id.; see also Garcia v. Santa Rosa Health Care Corp., 925 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1996, writ requested) (for the same proposition regarding an AIDS patient,
see discussion in section I.G(1) above).
91. 929 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).
92. Id.
93. 926 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. 1996).
94. Id.
95. 927 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1996).
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The decedent's parents sued Firestone for negligence and strict prod-
ucts liability. Firestone moved for summary judgment on the ground that
it did not design, manufacture, or sell the wheel in question, and there-
fore, it could not be liable based upon its original patent. The Texas
Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment, holding that "[i]f the origi-
nal designer of a system or prototype gives the design to another party,
this action alone is not enough to impose liability under a strict products
liability theory. '96 The court reaffirmed the position that strict products
liability requires proof that a defendant supplied the product that caused
the injury, stating that "[i]t is not enough that the seller merely intro-
duced products of similar design and manufacture into the stream of
commerce."
97
Explaining a failure to warn defect was the crux of Clark Equipment
Co. v. Pitner.98 As the plaintiff drove a forklift down a ramp, tilting the
forks of the forklift to keep the load level, the engine died. The forklift
continued traveling down the ramp, and the plaintiff had little control
over the steering and brakes. The plaintiff was injured while attempting
to jump off the forklift. The jury found a marketing defect based on a
failure to warn.
The court of appeals affirmed and held that a marketing defect exists
"when a defendant knows or should know of a potential risk of harm
presented by the product but markets it without adequately warning of
the danger or providing instructions for safe use." 99 An engineer for the
defendant, who had worked on the design of the brakes and the steering
for the type of forklift involved in the accident, testified that forklifts are
sometimes driven on slopes, that braking and steering becomes more dif-
ficult when the engine is not running, and that tilting the forks may cause
the engine to die. This evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
show the defendant's knowledge of the marketing defect. 1' °
The Statute of Repose was rejected as a defense in Astec Industries,
Inc. v. Suarez.' 10 The estates of several workers at an asphalt plant sued
the manufacturer of a hopper which had been installed as a part of a
material handling system. In affirming the judgment against the defend-
ant, the appellate court rejected defendant's assertion that the Texas Civil
Practices and Remedies Code section 16.009 precluded the suit because
the ten year Statute of Repose for real estate improvements had run. 02
The court relied on Sonnier v. Chisholm-Ryder Co.10 3 which held that the
statute protects only those who add personalty to real property.104 Be-
96. Id. at 613.
97. Id. at 614.
98. 923 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
99. Id. at 126.
100. Id. at 127.
101. 921 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
102. Id.




cause the manufacturer did not proffer evidence that it had installed the
machinery, rather than just manufactured it, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the Statute of Repose was inapplicable. 10 5
In Augustine v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,106 the widows of two ser-
vicemen killed in a helicopter crash sued the manufacturer for defective
design of the drive shaft. Bell claimed the "government contractor de-
fense," which precludes recovery under state law for military design de-
fects where "the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications, the equipment conformed to those specifications, and the
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States. 10 7 The appellate court reversed a summary judgment for Bell
because the government did not exercise discretion regarding the design
of the drive shaft.108
F. GOVERNMENTAL/OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Cortez v. Weatherford Independent School District'0 9 involved a wrong-
ful death action where a six-year-old child exiting a school bus was struck
and killed by a motorcycle. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that
the bus driver's act of unloading students was a discretionary function
according to the "Course Guide for School Bus Driver Training in
Texas," and thus, he was entitled to official immunity. 1 0 Also, the court
held that the school district was immune from liability."' Furthermore,
the school district's decision not to equip the bus with a stop arm was an
exercise of its discretionary powers and not subject to the Texas Tort
Claims Act's limited waiver of immunity." 2
In City of Orange v. Jackson,113 the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
that the city's sovereign immunity was not waived under the Texas Tort
Claims Act where an arrestee dies from her physical condition or from
the lack of medical attention.1 4 The court concluded that transporting
the arrestee by a police vehicle was not a misuse of tangible personal
property sufficient to pierce governmental immunity." 5
On the other hand, in Woods v. Moody, 116 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals refused to apply official immunity where an officer driving a motor
vehicle while on official, non-emergency business struck plaintiff's vehicle
105. Astec, 921 S.W.2d at 797.
106. 922 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
107. Id. at 290.
108. Id. at 291.
109. 925 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
110. Id. at 149.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 150.
113. 927 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).
114. Id. at 786.
115. Id. at 786-87.
116. 933 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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from behind.117 The appellate court held that the officer was performing
a ministerial act, not a discretionary act "such as engaging in a high speed
chase.""H8 Accordingly, the officer could be held liable for the resulting
damages.
In Drogin v. Campbell,1 9 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
if a state hospital employee exercised medical and not governmental dis-
cretion, the employee was not immune from tort liability.' 20 However,
official immunity may still be available if the employee's discretion was
colored by governmental factors and concerns. 12'
The scope of discretion was discussed further in Dickerson v. Davis.122
Dickerson invited Davis to sit with him on his lifeguard stand while Dick-
erson was monitoring a public swimming pool. While seated on the
stand, Dickerson "nudged" Davis with his feet and she fell into the pool
below. Davis filed suit against Dickerson and the City of Amarillo alleg-
ing negligence.
In denying Dickerson immunity, the appellate court explained that offi-
cial immunity shields a government employee from suits arising from the
performance of his "(1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as
[he is] (3) acting within the scope of [his] authority."'1 23 In determining
whether an action was a discretionary duty, the court of appeals looked to
the act of the employee at the time the incident occurred rather than the
employee's general job description. 24 The appellate court noted that
although a lifeguard has discretionary duties concerning the rendition of
assistance to pool patrons, not all actions performed by a lifeguard are
discretionary duties. 25 Because Dickerson did not establish that the inci-
dent occurred during the furtherance of a discretionary duty, summary
judgment was properly denied. 126
Procedural defects precluded official immunity in Texas Youth Com-
mission v. Givens. 27 Cooper brutally raped Givens on April 19, 1990.
At the time of the attack, Cooper was a youth under the care and control
of the Texas Youth Commission, which had been holding him at a maxi-
mum security facility. On April 19, 1990, Cooper escaped from a mini-
mum security ranch used by the Texas Youth Commission for supervised
recreational outings. As a result of the incident, Givens brought various
causes of action against the Commission. The district court granted in
part, and denied in part, the Commission's motion for summary judgment
based on official immunity. The appellate court affirmed because the
117. Id. at 308.
118. Id.
119. 928 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
120. Id. at 206.
121. Id. at 206-07.
122. 925 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
123. Id. at 125.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 126.
126. Id.
127. 925 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
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government failed to specially except to the vague petition's failure to
identify specific employees. 128
G. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS Acr
1. Premise or Special Defect
A poorly maintained stairwell constituted a special defect in Roberts v.
City of Grapevine.'2 9 Roberts lost her balance while walking down steps
that descended from an elevated sidewalk. The fall resulted in a sprain to
Roberts' right ankle and a fracture to her left ankle which required the
insertion of metal screws. Although Roberts knew that the sidewalk was
shaped differently than in other parts of town, Roberts stated that she lost
her balance as she descended the first step because the unusual height of
the first step startled her. Roberts brought a suit for damages under the
Texas Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the City a summary judg-
ment, holding that the defect in the step was a premise defect, and, there-
fore, the City owed Roberts the lesser duty owed to a licensee. 130
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the defective condition in
the steps was a, special defect.' 31 The court stated that "the primary issue
at hand is whether the defective condition in this case constituted a condi-
tion that presented an unexpected or unusual danger to the ordinary
users of the sidewalk and was, therefore, a special defect within the
[Texas Tort Claims Act].' 132 In its evaluation of the defect character, the
court relied upon the City's designation of the crosswalk for public use
and the size of the defect. 133 Because the City mandated pedestrian traf-
fic through an area with dilapidated steps, the City owed Roberts the
higher duty owed to an invitee to inspect and make repairs. 34
2. Condition or Use of Property
In Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark,135 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a state hospital's administration of an oral
drug, "rather than an injectionable drug, constitute[d] use or misuse of
tangible personal property under the terms of the Texas Tort Claims
Act."'1 36 The court reasoned that the hospital's failure to administer the
injectionable drug constituted a non-use of tangible personal property
and, therefore, did not fall within the waiver provisions of the Act.137 In
this case, the parents of a woman who had been murdered by her es-
tranged husband sued a state mental hospital for wrongful death. The
128. Id. at 763.
129. 923 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ requested).
130. Id. at 171.
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id. at 172.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 173.
135. 923 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1996).




husband, who was an outpatient at the hospital, was known to refuse his
medication and to become violent when not medicated. The. parents al-
leged that because of these known conditions, the hospital should have
used an injectionable drug instead of the oral drug that it had prescribed.
The Texas Supreme Court refused to waive the hospital's immunity. 138
H. DAMAGES
In Crawford v. Kirk,139 the court of appeals recognized a wrongful
pregnancy cause of action relating to the birth of a normal, healthy child
after a failed sterilization procedure. 140 The parents' damages, however,
were limited to the actual medical expenses incurred as a result of the
failed procedure, not the costs of raising the child.' 4'
1. Mental Anguish
In Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System, 42 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that "fear of contracting HIV and AIDS, such as
will support an award for mental anguish, should be reasonably based
upon circumstances showing actual exposure to the disease causing
agent."'1 43 However, fear of contracting the disease without actual expo-
sure is, "as a matter of law, unreasonable" and will not support an award
of damages for mental anguish.'"
An unrelated bystander could not recover mental anguish damages in
Motor Express, Inc. v. Rodriguez.'45 Two tractor-trailer rigs were parked
on the shoulder of the highway in front of Motor Express's premises.
While two men examined the rigs, a speeding car hit and killed one of the
men. The other man was not injured. The survivor, Rodriguez, sued Mo-
tor Express for the emotional distress he suffered as a result of watching
the other man's death and from his own life-threatening experience.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment for the de-
fendant. The court explained that "[t]here are few situations where a
[plaintiff] who is not physically injured by [a defendant] may recover
mental anguish."' 46 Because Rodriguez was not related to the deceased
and did not suffer a physical injury, and because Motor Express did not
owe a specific duty to Rodriguez under the circumstances, Rodriguez
could not recover mental anguish damages.147
Evidence necessary to support an award of mental anguish was lacking
138. Id.
139. 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ requested).
140. Id. at 637.
141. Id.
142. 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
143. Id. at 674.
144. Id. at 675.
145. 925 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1996).




in Saenz v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters.148 A jury found
that Saenz suffered damages of $250,000 for past and future mental
anguish. The appellate court reasoned that "[t]ranslating mental anguish
into dollars is necessarily an arbitrary process for which the jury is given
no guidelines.' 1 49 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed because
there was insufficient evidence to support the damages. 150 The court ad-
monished the appellate courts to conduct a meaningful evidentiary re-
view to determine whether the evidence accorded with the fact-finder's
award of damages. 15'
2. Exemplary Damages
In some situations, punitive damages cannot be recovered in maritime
actions, according to Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Waiters.152 Waiters, a
steward's assistant, injured his back when he fell down some stairs on
board the ship Overseas Marilyn. Maritime Overseas paid maintenance
and cure benefits to Waiters from April 1989 to late June 1989, but did
not pay maintenance and cure benefits from late June 1989 to August
1989. Waiters later twice requested maintenance and cure benefits for
reinjuries to his back, which Maritime Overseas paid once. Waiters then
sued under the Jones Act for negligence and under general maritime law
for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure benefits. The jury found
that Maritime's failure to pay maintenance and cure benefits was willful,
arbitrary, and capricious, and it awarded punitive damages. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed and followed Guevara v. Maritime Overseas
Corp.'53 in holding that nonpecuniary damages, including punitive dam-
ages, are not recoverable for maintenance and cure actions under general
maritime law. 154
In White v. Sullins, 55 the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that inabil-
ity to pay punitive damage awards will not work to judicially reduce the
award.' 56 While standing by his car, a police officer (Sullins) was struck
by an intoxicated hit and run driver (White). A jury found White grossly
negligent and awarded actual and exemplary damages to Sullins. On ap-
peal, White complained that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
jury award of five million dollars as punitive damages because he was a
laborer and would never be able to pay the judgment. In rejecting
White's contention, the appellate court explained that a defendant's net
worth is relevant in determining the amount of punitive damages that will
effectively punish the defendant, but "penury does not diminish the of-
148. 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1996).
149. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 917 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1996).
153. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706 (1996).
154. Waiters, 917 S.W.2d at 19.
155. 917 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
156. Id. at 163.
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fense.' 15 7 Accordingly, a defendant's inability to pay the judgment will
not reduce the amount of the judgment' 58
I. INSURANCE
In Howard v. INA County Mutual Insurance Co. 159 the Dallas Court of
Appeals held that, absent a written rejection, uninsured/underinsured
motorists coverage under article 5.06-1(1) of the Texas Insurance Code
exists by operation of law, regardless of the parties' intent or the absence
of premium payments.' 60 The court further held that the parties may not
reform the insurance contract to reject the uninsured/underinsured mo-
torists coverage retroactively to extinguish claims that have arisen during
that policy period.' 61
In Valentine v. Safeco Lloyds Insurance Co.,162 the Houston Court of
Appeals held that an employee acting within the scope of her employ-
ment, and injured due to her employer's negligence, may not collect from
her underinsured motorist coverage since she recovered workers' com-
pensation benefits.' 63
J. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A carrier cannot be forced to pay the attorney's fees of a claimant
under the facts of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mayfield.164 Travelers
brought an action for judicial review of a determination by the Workers'
Compensation Commission granting Mayfield benefits. The district court
granted a request by Mayfield for the appointment of an attorney to rep-
resent her and ordered Travelers to pay the attorney's reasonable fees.
Mayfield asserted that such appointment was proper under Texas Labor
Code section 408.147(c). The Texas Supreme Court reversed because the
Workers' Compensation Act does not require the carrier to pay attor-
ney's fees for the claimant.' 65
The acceptance of compensation benefits precluded a later suit against
an employer in Medina v. Herrera.166 Medina alleged that he injured his
back when Herrera, his supervisor, assaulted him. Medina filed a work-
ers' compensation claim, which the employer's carrier paid. Two years
later, Medina sued Herrera and his employer for damages arising from
the intentional tort. The Texas Supreme Court held that the suit against
the employer and the receipt of compensation benefits were mutually ex-
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 933 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
160. Id. at 218.
161. Id. at 220.
162. 928 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
163. Id. at 644.
164. 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996).
165. Id.
166. 927 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1996).
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clusive remedies. 167 Accordingly, the court held that the suit against the
employer was barred. 168 Nevertheless, the court permitted the claim
against Herrera to continue. 169
In Sims v. Western Waste Industries,170 Sims brought a suit against a
truck manufacturer and the parent corporation of his employer for an on
the job injury he sustained to his leg. The trial court granted the parent
corporation's summary judgment because, as the parent corporation, it
was entitled to assert the same immunity as the employer under an "alter
ego" theory of the compensation bar.171 The court of appeals reversed
the summary judgment, holding that the alter ego theory is designed to
impose liability on a parent corporation and that it is not a means of
escaping liability. 72 The legislature never intended to permit a parent
corporation, "who deliberately chose to establish the subsidiary corpora-
tion," to assert the immunity of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.
173
K. FEDERAL REGULATION PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 74 consolidated with American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Shupe, presents the question of whether the federal airline
regulations preempt Texas tort law. Norma Kiefer was injured when a
flight attendant dropped a bag from an overhead storage bin on her head.
Kiefer sought damages for her injuries, and her husband sought damages
for loss of society. The trial court granted summary judgement to Conti-
nental on the ground that the Kiefer's common law claims were pre-
empted by federal law. 175 The court of appeals reversed and remanded
for trial, holding that the statute in question, the Airline Deregulation
Act, 176 did not expressly preempt the claims. 177
Douglas Shupe sued American Airlines and Metro Airlines for injuries
allegedly incurred when the airlines failed to provide "meet and assist"
services for a passenger needing assistance at DFW Airport. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the airlines. The court of
appeals determined that the Airline Deregulation Act, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court in American Airlines v. Wolens,178 pre-
empted the state DTPA claims, but not the negligence or breach of con-
167. Id. at 602.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 918 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
171. Id. at 683.
172. Id. at 686.
173. Id.
174. 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
175. Id. at 275.
176. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994))
(provides that no state can enact a law relating to rates, routes, or service of any air
carrier).
177. Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 496, 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994), aff'd, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).




The Texas Supreme Court held that the federal regulations did not pre-
empt common law personal injury negligence claims nor breach of con-
tract claims. 180 However, the court held that DTPA claims are
preempted by the federal regulations. 181 The court reasoned that com-
mon law negligence claims and breach of contract claims do not impair
federal regulation. 182 It noted that punitive damages or mental anguish
damages might impair deregulation; however, those issues were not
before the court. 183
L. OTHER
Consent judgments and subsequent assignment of claims against an in-
surance company were rejected in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Gandy.'8 Gandy sued her step-father, Pearce, for sexually abusing her
as a child. State Farm, the Pearce's homeowner's insurer, agreed to pay
the attorney whom Pearce had chosen to defend him, but reserved its
right to deny coverage. During the pendency of the case, Pearce pleaded
no contest to criminal charges brought by Gandy. Without notifying
State Farm, Pearce settled with Gandy for over six million dollars and
assigned to Gandy any claims that Pearce might have against his insurer.
Gandy agreed never to attempt to collect the judgment against Pearce.
Gandy then sued State Farm as Pearce's assignee to collect the agreed
judgment and to recover damages for State Farm's alleged failure to
properly defend Pearce. The trial court granted summary judgment for
State Farm on the policy suit, and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment against Gandy. The court held that the assignment by Pearce
of his claims violated public policy because it tended to increase and dis-
tort litigation. 185
179. Shupe v. American Airlines, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1995), aff'd sub nom. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1996).
180. Continental, 920 S.W.2d at 284.
181. Id. at 278.
182. Id at 282-83.
183. Id.
184. 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
185. Id. at 715.
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